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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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21 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : NRO Meeting

1. Messrs. Scoville, Giller, Lundahl, Miller, Reber, Beerli, and Kiefer discussed on 18 May various items related to setting up the NRO. This discussion was intended to define CIA views on these matters in preparation for conversations with Dr. Charyk on Tuesday, 22 May. The 25 April 1962 paper of agreement on NRO between DOD and CIA formed the basis for these discussions. The issues raised by this discussion were as follows:

a. In order that NRO can respond properly in developing a total reconnaissance program to meet USIB requirements a mechanism must be established to inform the using community of future developments and to receive guidance from the using community in defining future systems. This likewise will permit exploitation equipment developments to keep pace with collection projects.

Art Lundahl reported a DIA study of the desirability of changing presently assigned individual service representatives now at NPIC into DIA personnel and separately setting up a DIA photo interpretation center.

A memorandum of 12 March 1962 to DIA from General Curtin is pertinent in that it sets forth procedures for exchange of information on the national reconnaissance program between his office (SAFMS) acting for NRO and DIA and NPIC.

It was agreed that NPIC should not become the mechanism for exchange of data on future projects with the using community.

The wording of paragraph 2.a.(2) ^{OF 25 APRIL PAPER} implies that the personnel assigned from the services and agency to NRO would fulfill this function.

b. It was agreed that the definition of the national reconnaissance program as including, but at the same time limited only to, all overflight activity need be re-examined. The considerable peripheral activity of the JNC requires coordination with overflight activity in support of USIB requirements. Furthermore, by this definition, projects such as the System X would be assigned to NRO or elsewhere for

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bureaucratic rather than logical reasons. This also raises the issue of the seat of authority for decision on peripheral versus overflight activity to satisfy specific USIB requirements. It appears that the Director of NRO should be in the chain of approval for JRC activities.

c. It was agreed that the Director of NRO should ask USIB to define the means for forming electronic intelligence requirements. Messrs. Reber and Miller are to explore how NSA views can be appropriately considered but restrained from dominance.

d. The policy of assignment of individual projects to CIA or to DOD requires a management agreement on individual projects as was done in the case of LANYARD. That particular set of agreements should not become a pattern for all projects, however. Assignments should be made on the basis of which agency is best able to manage particular projects.

e. Specific agreements are needed on scope and limitations of authority and responsibility of the NRO staff. It is Agency view that once a specific project has been defined and assigned for technical and operational management the NRO staff will have no authority for that project. Also individuals assigned to NRO staff should not be viewed as part time liaison officers with responsibility to their parent service. This latter view may be at odds with paragraph 2.a.(2).

A major part, if not the sole activity, of the NRO staff will be long range planning. An NRO budget to support study work is required and a clear distinction between the functions of the NRO staff and General Greer's staff needs definition. Agency view is that long range planning should be done in Washington by NRO staff.

There are several substantive and administrative questions requiring consideration and agreement. Examples are:

Specific requirements in number and qualifications of individuals.

Actual location of NRO.

Cover explanation for NRO.

Length of tour versus career service.

Internal working procedures and structure.

Administrative support.

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f. The modernization of the EK processing facility raises several related questions.

Should initial processing continue as an NRO responsibility or pass to DIA?

Should the present facility be continued independently or modernized in conjunction with the [] facility?

Should funding be from CIA, AF, NRO, or jointly?

What will be role of AFPPS Westover?

A letter containing EK policy and recommendations on some of these matters is to be delivered this evening for consideration during talks expected on Tuesday, 22 May 1962.

/s/
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Development Projects Division

E.P.Kiefer:SA/TA/DPD [] (21 May 1962)

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